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Abstract— Marine industry is leaning towards the 
autonomous vessels; and advanced technologies are being 
developed for autonomous operations. However, this rapid 
technological change has increased the level of complexity in 
ship systems. As the interactions between components are 
increasing further and software are getting imbedded into 
components, the nature of risks in modern systems can be 
different than in the traditional systems; where the risks were 
mostly limited to human errors and component failures. 
However, for identifying risks in modern systems, it is first 
important to understand the system composition and the 
behavior of components. Since traditional system-safety 
engineering techniques, developed for the relatively simpler 
systems in past, are still dominant in marine industry. These 
techniques may not be able to cope with the risks due to 
increasing complexity. 
This paper reviews and identifies a suitable modelling 
approach and a risk analysis method for a complex ship system.  
A modern modeling approach known as Systems-Modeling 
Language (SysML) and a modern risk analysis method known 
as Systems-Theoretical Process Analysis (STPA) are reviewed 
and compared with widely used traditional methods known as 
the Tree structure method and Fault Tree Analysis. SysML is a 
graphical modeling language that presents structural 
composition, component functions, behavior, constraints and 
requirements of a complex system. STPA is a risk analysis 
method that aims to identify and mitigate risks in a complex 
system. The review and comparison results are presented in the 
paper. 
The results of this study suggest that the modern methods 
are more suitable than the traditional methods when the 
functionality of each method are considered. However, as the 
modern methods are more detailed, and are focused on the 
functionality, they are relatively complex and require more 
resources for the analysis in comparison to the traditional 
methods. Some viable solutions to improve the drawbacks of 
SysML and STPA, and possible future research topics are 
presented.  
Keywords—STPA, SysML, FTA, Tree structure method, 
complex systems, safety engineering techniques. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. Research background 
Autonomous vehicles are already the state of the art for 
roadways and airways. However, autonomous ships are still in 
the early phase of development. Nevertheless, after the initial 
feasibility study project, Maritime Unmanned Navigation 
through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN), companies such 
as Rolls-Royce, Kongsberg and Vigor Industrial have already 
initiated projects to construct autonomous ships; and are set to 
mark the beginning of a new era of shipping in the near future. 
Autonomous vessels have attracted several marine 
professionals and companies, as they have the potential to 
improve the sustainability of the marine transport industry by 
reducing the environmental impacts, operational expenses and 
the shortage of seagoing professionals [1]. Thus, for 
autonomous operations, advanced features in ship systems 
such as advanced navigation and sensor fusion are being 
developed [2] [1]. As a result, the level of complexity in the 
ship system is increasing further. 
Although, the technologies in ship systems are advancing 
at a faster pace, system safety engineering techniques are 
lagging far behind. Traditional risk analysis methods such as 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) are still widely used for identifying risks in 
modern marine vessels. These methods were developed 
several decades ago for relatively simpler systems; and they 
were effective at past because of their ability to analyze the 
system by isolating and simplifying the interfaces between 
system components [3]. Unlike traditional systems, 
components in modern systems cannot be treated independent, 
as the interactions among components are increasing and 
software are being embedded in components and sub systems. 
As a result, it is unsurprising that the nature of accidents is also 
changing [3]. There is a possibility that traditional methods 
may not identify these emerging risks. Hence, a review of 
modern and traditional methods for risk analysis is important 
for future projects. 
However, for identifying risks in a complex system, it is 
first important to understand the system itself. Since, the 
interactions among components are growing, understanding 
how the component interacts to perform activities or functions 
is crucial. Furthermore, the analysts must also understand how 
components are interconnected for identifying risks in a 
system. With better understanding of the system, the risk 
analysis methods will then be more effective. Moreover, these 
models can help operators to operate the system efficiently; 
and allows designers or analysts to understand the system for 
improving the future system designs. In addition, models can 
also be used to guide the design process through the 
requirements analysis of the system.  Thus, a modeling 
approach that can present the overview of a complex ship 
system is as crucial as the risk analysis method; and a suitable 
modeling approach for complex ship system needs to be 
identified and implemented. 
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B. Research objectives 
The aim of this research is to identify a suitable modeling 
approach and a risk analysis method for a complex ship 
system. Thus, for achieving the aim, a widely used traditional 
method will be compared with a modern method developed 
for a complex system.  
This paper should aim to answer following research 
questions: 
1. Which approach is suitable for modeling a complex 
ship system? 
2. Which method is suitable for identifying risks in a 
complex ship system? 
C. Research limitations 
As the scope of this research is wide, following 
limitations have been considered: 
1. Only two modeling approaches and two risk 
analysis methods are selected for review and 
comparison. 
2. The following simplifications were made on the 
methods:  
a. A simplified version of SysML labelled as 
SysML-lite has been used for the review in 
this paper. (more information on the review 
chapter) 
b. Deriving cut sets for failures in FTA has 
not been considered in the review. 
3. Due to the lack of data about the failure in a complex 
ship system, probabilistic methods are not 
considered. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Review of modelling approaches 
1) Introduction and selection of methods 
Modelling approaches aim to provide the overview of a 
system through different models. These models are required 
to understand the system as they present the composition of 
the system, and interactions and behavior of the system 
components. As the systems in past were relatively simpler 
with low component interactions and were easier to 
understand, modelling approaches for physical systems were 
not much developed. However, the increased complexity in 
modern systems has led to the realization of the importance 
of modelling approaches. As a result, some modelling 
approaches for the complex systems were developed 
recently.  
 
The only traditional modeling approach that is being 
widely used is the Tree structure method, which only presents 
a structure of a system in a hierarchical approach. 
Furthermore, texts are used to explain the system properties 
and functions in the specification documents. On the other 
hand, there are two modeling approaches developed recently 
for complex systems known as Object-Process Methodology 
(OPM) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML). 
 
a) Object-Process Methodology (OPM) 
OPM is a modeling approach that aims to model complex 
systems in a holistic approach. It presents the structural 
composition, the behavioral and the functional aspects of the 
system in a single diagram. In addition to a graphical model, 
it also includes textual representations for better 
understanding about the system. [4] 
 
b) Systems Modeling Language (SysML) 
SysML is a general-purpose modeling language, which 
supports the analysis, design, verification, specification and 
validation of complex systems. It includes nine different 
types of diagrams to present the structure, behavior, and 
requirements of the system. Furthermore, it also provides 
support for the engineering analysis of a system with a 
parametric diagram. [5] 
 
c) General comparison and selection of methods for 
the review. 
OPM and SysML, both were developed to model complex 
systems. OPM aims to present an overview of a complex 
system with a single diagram and texts. SysML on the other 
hand, present diagrams of nine different kind for the same 
purpose. A general comparison between these methods is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. A general comparison between OPM and SysML. 
Question OPM SysML 
Does it model the structural 
composition of a system? 
Yes Yes 
Does it model the behavior of a 
system? 
Yes Yes 
Does it present the requirements of 
a system? 
No Yes 
Does it provide any tool for the 
engineering analysis of the system? 
No Yes 
Structure of a model A single 
diagram and 
texts 
Diagrams of 9 
different kind 
 
Although both methods manage to present the structure 
and behavior of complex systems, SysML presents the 
requirements of systems and supports analysts for performing 
the engineering analysis of a system, which is lacking in OPM 
[4]. Furthermore, Modern vessel usually consists of several 
complex systems. Thus, a single type of diagram for modeling 
the structure and behavior of the system can be difficult and 
complex to manage.  
Based on the comparison and initial review, SysML and 
the Tree structure method are selected for reviewing. 
 
2) The Tree structure method review 
The Tree structure method is one of the widely used 
traditional modeling approaches which presents a graphical 
model of the composition of a system. In this model, the 
system is classified into subsystems and components in a 
hierarchy, which resembles like a tree. A tree structure starts 
with a single source or edge and the classification is shown 
with branches that develop along nodes [6]. Each element of 
the tree such as systems, sub-systems and components are 
represented as nodes and are connected with a solid line. 
 In the Tree structure method, the system is placed in the 
first level node of the tree. The system is then classified into 
sub systems in the second level. The sub systems are further 
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classified into components and the level continues further as 
required. A classification of a propulsion plant in an offshore 
patrol vessel presented in [7] is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Moreover, this approach has also been adapted to various 
fields. For example, FTA uses this structure to classify faults 
and processes by adding this structure with Boolean logic 
gates and different node types. Similarly, decision trees used 
in machine learning also utilizes tree structure for classifying 
decisions. Hence, it is utilized widely in different fields where 
there is a need to show the classification of a system, event 
and data into further details in a simple manner. 
 
3) Systems Modeling Language (SysML) review 
Note: This section aims to review a modeling language called 
Systems Modeling Language (SysML). A simplified version 
of SysML known as SysML-lite is reviewed in this paper. 
The SysML-lite is provided in a Chapter 3 of book “A 
Practical Guide to SysML” by Sanford Friedenthal, Alan 
Moore and Rick Steiner [8]. The diagrams in this review were 
generated by using Astah SysML [9] and Modelio Open 
Source 3.7 [10]. 
 
a) Introduction 
SysML is a graphical modeling language for presenting 
an overview of a system that includes the structural 
composition, behavior, constraints and requirements of a 
system. SysML supports the analysis, specification, design, 
verification, and validation of complex systems. It is an 
extension of a subset of the Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) used in software engineering. 
  
SysML aims to model the following aspects: 
1. The structural composition of the system. 
2. Interconnection between systems, subsystems, and 
components. 
3. Exchange of messages between parts of the system. 
4. The actions and behavior of the system and its 
components. 
5. The parametric relationships of the properties of the 
system and its components. 
b) SysML diagrams 
SysML includes nine different diagrams, which are as 
follows: 
1. Package diagram  
2. Requirement diagram 
3. Activity diagram 
4. Sequence diagram 
5. State machine diagram 
6. Use case diagram 
7. Block definition diagram 
8. Internal block diagram 
9. Parametric diagram 
SysML-lite excludes the sequence diagram, the state 
machine diagram and the use case diagram of SysML. 
Furthermore, it only includes a subset of available language 
features. However, it still provides significant modeling 
capabilities.  
BLOCK DEFINITION DIAGRAM 
Blocks are the basic structural elements in SysML and are 
used to represent the components of a system such as 
hardware software, data, procedure, facility, or a person. 
Furthermore, a block can contain different compartments for 
holding the block features such as properties, operations, and 
constraints.  
 
The block definition diagram, labeled bdd, is often used to 
describe the structural composition of a system. It shows the 
sets of blocks and its characteristics in a system. An example 
of the block definition diagram for an air compressor is 
shown in Figure 2. The figure shows the components of an 
air compressor system. The connector with black diamond at 
one end and arrow at another represents a whole-part 
relationship. The system is placed in the black diamond end 
and its components are placed at the arrow end. 
 
Figure 1. A classification of a propulsion plant in an offshore patrol vessel using the Tree structure method. 
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Figure 2. A block definition diagram for an air compressor. 
INTERNAL BLOCK DIAGRAM  
An internal block diagram, labeled ibd, in SysML 
presents the internal structure and connections of the 
components in a system. In this diagram, the interconnections 
between components are shown using ports and connectors. 
Ports are the interaction points on a block for the connection 
and specify component interfaces; and a connector is a line 
that connects the blocks in the internal block diagram. An 
internal block diagram of an air compressor is shown in 
Figure 3. The figure presents the interconnection and 
interactions between the components inside an air 
compressor. 
 
 
Figure 3. An internal block diagram of an air compressor. 
REQUIREMENT DIAGRAM 
Complex systems have a set of requirements that needs to 
be fulfilled for a system to function; and are presented in its 
specification document. A requirement diagram, labeled req, 
is used in SysML to show these sets of text-based 
requirements in a graphical model. Each requirement block 
in this diagram has compartments that displays the id of the 
requirement and text explaining the requirement. This 
diagram helps designers to create a design according to the 
requirements of the system and to verify the design later.  In 
addition, it can be used for the system analysis during an 
operational period, to check if the system deviates from 
intended design for identifying risks in a system. Figure 4 
shows a requirement diagram for an air compressor. The 
values for each requirement are not provided in the diagram 
and are replaced by X. 
 
Figure 4. A requirement diagram for an air compressor. 
ACTIVITY DIAGRAM  
The activity diagram, labeled act, in SysML presents how 
an initialized process or activity is carried out inside a system. 
It shows all the components involved in the activity, the 
sequence of the interactions, the required inputs to the 
activity, and the output, which is produced from the activity. 
The symbols used in the activity diagram and their 
descriptions are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The symbols and description of nodes used in the activity 
diagram. 
Symbol Description 
 
Initial Node: This symbol is used to indicate the starting 
point of the activity. 
 
Final Node: This symbol is used to indicate the ending 
point of the activity. 
 
Fork Node: This node is used to duplicate a flow of action 
into multiple parallel flows. 
 
Join Node: This node is used to join different multiple 
flows together into one. 
 
Action Node: This symbol is used to denote an action. 
 
 
Object Node: This symbol is used to denote the inputs and 
outputs of the activity. 
 
Figure 5 shows the activity diagram for compressing air. 
At first, the total content area available for the activity 
diagram is partitioned depending on the number of 
subsystems or components, which are required for the 
activity and are labelled. An initial node is placed to denote 
the start of the activity. Then the action nodes are placed in a 
correct sequence in their respective component partition. 
Furthermore, the inputs required for the process and the 
outputs from the process are placed in an object node; and are 
connected to the action nodes. The control flows in the 
activity such as a connection between an initial node and a 
controller, are represented with a dashed line, while the action 
flows and object flows are represented with a solid line. A 
final node is then added to the control flow to denote the 
completion of the control activity. Thus, this diagram 
presents the sequence in which the action is carried in a 
system and the components involved in it. 
 
ACEE0206              The 7th Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 22-25 November 2018, Bangkok, Thailand  
 
 
Figure 5. An activity diagram for compressing air. 
PARAMETRIC DIAGRAM 
Parametric diagrams, labeled par, in SysML are used to 
express constraints for supporting the engineering analysis of 
the system such as performance and reliability. Furthermore, 
it also helps to identify the critical performance properties of 
the system for design improvements. In a parametric diagram, 
a constraint block is used in the model that holds an equation 
or set of equations for the analysis. The properties or values 
that are required by the equations are then imported from the 
blocks in the block definition diagram. A parametric diagram 
for the flow rate analysis of the air compressor is shown in 
Figure 6. The equations for the analysis are not shown in the 
diagram for simplicity. 
 
 
Figure 6. Parametric diagram for the flow analysis of Air compressor. 
PACKAGE DIAGRAM  
The SysML diagrams contain several model elements 
such as blocks, requirements, constraints as discussed in 
previous diagrams. As the modern systems are usually 
comprised of several components and functions, the number 
of model elements in a SysML model can get large. Thus, 
managing these vast numbers of elements is necessary; and 
for this purpose, packages are created in SysML. A package 
acts as a folder and is used to group similar model elements 
together. [8]  
 
A package diagram, labeled pkg, in SysML displays all 
the packages within a system model. An example of a 
package diagram is shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. An example of a package diagram in SysML. 
B. Risk analysis methods review 
1) Introduction and selection of methods 
Risk analysis methods aim to identify risks in a system to 
avoid hazards and accidents. As explained in the research 
background of this paper, the nature of risks is changing 
because of increasing component interactions. Most of the 
traditional risk analysis methods that are currently used for 
identifying risks in a ship system do not focus on potential 
issues due to component interactions. However, traditional 
risk analysis methods are still dominant in the risk analysis of 
the ship systems. Hence, this review aims to compare a 
widely used traditional method, which was developed for 
simpler systems of past and a modern method that was 
developed for identifying risks in complex systems.  
 
The mostly used traditional risk analysis methods are 
Fault Tree analysis (FTA), Failure modes and effect analysis 
(FMEA) and Hazard and operability study (HAZOP).  Thus, 
one of these methods will be compared with a modern method 
developed for identifying risks in complex systems known as 
System-Theoretical Process Analysis (STPA). 
 
a) System’s-Theoretical Process Analysis (STPA) 
STPA, based on system’s theory, aims to identify risks in 
a complex system. Instead of identifying risks by breaking 
down the system into component level, it uses a holistic 
approach and starts by identifying accidents and risks at the 
system level. 
 
b) Fault Trees analysis (FTA)  
FTA aims to identify all combinations of events that lead 
to a fault in a system. It is a top down approach, which uses 
logic gates to illustrate the combinations in a graphical model. 
[11] 
c) Failure mode and Effect analysis (FMEA)  
FMEA is a method used to identify faults and failure 
modes of components in a system. Furthermore, it also 
includes the effect and severity of faults. Unlike FTA, the 
result of this analysis is presented in a table. [11] 
 
d) Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) 
HAZOP is a method that uses different guidewords such 
as “no” and “less” to identify potential deviations from 
intended or designed function in a system. The result of 
HAZOP includes the identified deviations, causes and 
consequences and the result is presented in a table. [11] 
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Based on the literature review [12], a general comparison 
of FTA, FMEA and HAZOP is presented in Table 3. The 
scale used in the comparison are Easy/ Moderate/ Difficult 
and Yes/No according to the context. 
 
Table 3. A general comparison between FTA, FMEA and HAZOP [12]. 
Question FTA FMEA HAZOP 
How difficult is it to understand 
the method? 
Moderate Easy Easy 
How difficult is it to implement 
the method? 
Easy Easy Easy 
Is it possible to conduct without 
a team? 
Yes No No 
Is there any availability of 
software assistance for the 
analysis?  
Yes Yes Yes 
Does it analyze the 
combination of events for 
identifying fault 
Yes No No 
What is the result format? Graphical 
model. 
Table Table 
 
 FTA is comparatively difficult than FMEA and HAZOP 
as it includes different scientific theories and principal such 
as logic theory, Boolean algebra and reliability theory. 
However, it analyzes the combination of events for 
identifying risks which is lacking in FMEA and HAZOP. 
Furthermore, the FMEA and HAZOP analysis requires a 
team and it lacks in analyzing the combination of events for 
identifying faults. Thus, FTA was selected as the traditional 
method to be compared with STPA. 
 
2) Fault Trees Analysis (FTA) 
Note: The FTA symbols presented in this paper were 
generated using Edraw Max 9.1 software [13]. 
 
a) Introduction 
Fault Tree analysis is a traditional risk analysis method 
developed in 1962 by H. Watson and Allison B. Mearns of 
Bell Telephone Laboratories. It was developed for the U.S. 
Air force to evaluate Minuteman missile launch system. 
Later, this method was adopted and developed by a Boeing 
company, and since then many other industries have 
implemented FTA as a part of their hazard analysis process. 
[12] 
 
FTA is a graphical model that determines how a 
combination of fault processes and component failures or 
even a normal process can lead to an undesired event. This 
undesired event can be an accident or hazard for a system. In 
qualitative FTA, several types of events are represented with 
different node shapes. Moreover, the diverse combinations of 
these events are then presented with Boolean logic gates and 
symbols in a tree-like structure. 
 
b) FTA building blocks 
Different node types are connected to create an FTA 
diagram. Each node contains a rectangular block for texts and 
are interconnected by Boolean logic and symbols. There are 
four categories of node types in FTA, which are Basic Events 
(BE), Conditional Events (CE), Gate Events (GE), and 
Transfer Events (TE). [12] 
BASIC EVENTS (BE) 
This category consists of the normal events and failure 
events of the system that can lead to a hazard or fault. The 
symbols and descriptions of the basic events are presented in 
Table 4 [12]. 
 
Table 4. Symbols and descriptions of the basic events in FTA. 
Type Symbol Description 
Normal event 
 
It is described as an event that occurs as 
intended or designed. Although the event 
is normal in an individual level, but when 
combined with other events can result in 
faults. 
Primary 
failure event 
 
It represents a basic failure event such as 
component failure that cannot be further 
developed. 
Secondary 
failure event 
 
It represents an undeveloped event. It can 
be undeveloped due to lack of 
information about the event or if it does 
not require further resolution. 
 
CONDITIONAL EVENTS (CE) 
Conditional events denote a condition that is required for 
some specific gate events to occur. A CE is represented by an 
ellipse and is attached to the gate events. A Conditional Event 
attached to an AND gate is shown in Figure 8. [12] 
 
 
Figure 8. A conditional event attached to AND gate in FTA. 
GATE EVENTS (GE) 
In FTA, the events are linked with different logical 
operators known as gates. There are five different gate types 
in FTA and each of the gates represent a unique combination 
of events leading to the fault. Table 5 presents the different 
types of gate events used in FTA [12]. 
TRANSFER EVENTS (TE) 
Transfer event is used to indicate a subtree branch that is 
used elsewhere in the tree. A triangle symbol, shown in 
Figure 9, is used to denote this combination in FTA. A 
Transfer In symbol is used in the place where the branch is 
getting imported and a Transfer Out symbol is then connected 
to a branch that is getting transferred which indicates that the 
branch is in use with another FTA. [12] 
 
 
Figure 9. The symbols of Transfer events used in FTA. 
ACEE0206              The 7th Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 22-25 November 2018, Bangkok, Thailand  
 
Table 5. The symbols and description of different types of gates in FTA. 
Type Symbol Description 
AND 
Gate 
 
This gate is used if the output event 
occurs only when several input 
events occur together. 
OR Gate 
 
This gate is used if the output event 
occurs when any of the input events 
occur. 
Priority 
AND 
Gate  
This gate is used if the output event 
occurs when all of the input events 
occur together but in a specific order 
or priority. The priority statement is 
placed in the conditional event 
symbol. 
Exclusive 
OR Gate  
This gate is used if the output event 
occurs when either of the input events 
occurs but not when all of the input 
events occur. The exclusivity 
statement is placed in the conditional 
event symbol. 
Inhibit 
Gate  
This gate is used if the output event 
occurs when the input event occurs, 
and a specific condition is satisfied. 
The condition is placed in the 
conditional event symbol. 
 
c) Procedure 
A Fault Tree is developed at different levels with 
branches. The basic steps for constructing a Fault Tree are as 
following [12]: 
1. Review and understand the fault event. 
2. Identify all the probable causes of this fault event 
and develop further if it is required. 
3. Identify the relationship of the Cause-Effect events. 
4. Structure the tree with appropriate gate events for 
identified input events. 
5. Review for a possible repetition of events.  
6. Move to the next fault and repeat the process. 
d) Example of FTA 
An FTA for motor overheating is presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. An FTA diagram of motor overheating [14]. 
3) Systems-Theoretical process analysis (STPA) 
 
a) Introduction 
STPA is a new hazard analysis technique developed in 
2011 by Nancy Leveson (Professor of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics in MIT). Similar to other hazard analysis 
methods, it aims to identify the hazards and risks of the 
system. As traditional methods focus on identifying risks 
related to component failures and human errors, STPA also 
focuses on identifying other possible failures such as unsafe 
interactions among non-failing components, which can be 
caused from design flaws. [15] 
 
STPA analysis is an iterative process and includes the 
following steps [15]:  
1. Establish the foundation for the analysis. i.e. 
identify accidents and hazards, and prepare the 
control structure of the system. 
2. Identify the potentially unsafe control actions in 
the system.  
3. Create safety constraints and requirements for 
unsafe control action. 
4. Determine how the unsafe control action could 
occur. 
b) Procedure 
Step 1: Establishing the foundation for the analysis. 
STPA analysis starts by defining the accidents of the 
system Accidents can be defined as events that involve the 
loss or injury of humans in the system or loss of the system 
itself. After defining all the accidents of the system, hazards 
leading to each accident are identified. These identified 
accidents and hazards are reported in a table format. All 
hazards are then analyzed in detail; and safety constraints for 
eliminating or controlling them are created. 
 
Next, a control structure of a system is prepared for 
analyzing all possible control actions in a system. As 
identifying accidents, hazards and safety constraints are 
common features of most of the hazard analysis techniques, 
this step makes STPA analysis unique from the rest. The 
control structure provides a graphical illustration of 
interactions among components and controllers.  
  
For making a control structure, the main components of 
the system are first identified. Then, controllers and 
controlled components are classified among the components; 
and a control structure that shows the interactions between 
those components are created. A simple control structure for 
In-Trail procedure (ITP) is presented in Figure 11. However, 
the control structure can be prepared in detail if required. [15] 
 
The control actions from the controllers in the control 
structure are presented with a solid line and the feedback 
received from the controlled components are presented with 
dashed line as shown in Figure 11.  
 
ACEE0206              The 7th Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 22-25 November 2018, Bangkok, Thailand  
 
 
Figure 11. A simple control structure for In-Trail procedure (ITP) [15]. 
 
Step 2: Identifying the potential unsafe control actions. 
After determining all possible control actions within the 
system, the unsafe control actions are identified using the 
guidewords. Standard guidewords used in STPA analysis are 
not providing the control action, providing the control action, 
providing the action too early or too late, and stopping the 
control action too soon or applying for too long [15].  
 
All control actions are analyzed using the guidewords. 
For example, the analyst will check if providing or not 
providing the control action can cause any hazard in a system. 
The results of analyzed control actions with these keywords 
are then documented on a table. 
 
Step 3: Creating safety constraints and requirements for 
unsafe control action. 
After identifying all unsafe control actions of the system, 
safety constraints are implemented to control the hazard. For 
example, the safety constraints for unsafe control action “ITP 
executed when not approved” can be that “the flight crew 
must not execute the ITP until approved by the Air Traffic 
Control” [15]. This step is completed once safety constraints 
for all identified unsafe control actions are provided. 
Step 4: Determining how the unsafe control actions could 
occur. 
As only identifying unsafe control action in a system is 
insufficient for mitigating the risks in a system, how the 
unsafe control actions can occur in the system and what are 
its effects are determined in the final step of STPA analysis 
process. After knowing the causes of these unsafe control 
actions, again safety constraints will be established and 
enforced in a system to mitigate the risks. However, this step 
requires an input from experienced experts, as they are the 
one who can identify how these unsafe control actions can 
happen in a system. For example, an unsafe control action 
“Crew not providing manual braking in an aircraft when 
required” can result due to the following reason:  
“The crew incorrectly believes that the autobrake feature is 
armed and will be engaged. This can happen due to a mistake 
of the crew or system design error such as multiple and 
conflicting messages, and alarm fatigue”. [15]  
 
Finally, the STPA analysis is completed after the safety 
constraints to control the causes of unsafe control actions, are 
created and enforced. 
III. DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The Tree structure method successfully presents the 
structural composition of the system However, it fails to 
provide the behavior or requirements, which is very 
important for understanding a complex ship system. SysML 
on the other hand, can present the structural composition of a 
system, requirements, and behavior of components. 
Furthermore, it also provides a diagram that can be used as a 
tool for conducting the engineering analysis of a system. The 
internal structure of a system, which is presented in an 
internal block diagram in SysML, helps to understand the 
connection and interactions between components, which is 
not provided by the Tree structure method. However, with 
increased capabilities and detailed modeling, the level of 
complexity of the method also increases. Furthermore, the 
time required for the analysis is also much higher than the 
Tree structure method.  
 
Similarly, traditional risk analysis methods such as FTA 
are still dominant in marine industry. The review shows that 
the FTA is a simple and effective method for systems when 
the focus is on component failures and the combination of 
events in system leading to the fault. However, the concern 
with FTA is that it does not consider all type of risks in the 
system but only covers the major risks that are known to the 
analysts. As a result, they lack in analyzing most of the 
possible risks due to component interactions, which is 
growing with time in complex ship systems and should not 
be neglected. However, STPA analyzes a higher number of 
possible risks due to control actions i.e. component 
interactions and human errors. As the implementation of 
technology and autonomous functions in vessels will result in 
increased human design errors, FTA lacks to analyze those 
issues, where STPA on the other hand identifies most of the 
design errors and provide constraints to mitigate them. 
Furthermore, STPA analysis provides a systematic approach 
for identifying and mitigating risks. The STPA can be also 
applied during the early phase of a system design to guide the 
design process ensuring a safer design of a system. 
 
As the overall functionality of SysML and STPA seems 
to be better than traditional methods, improving the 
drawbacks of these methods are important. The drawbacks of 
SysML and STPA identified in the review were the higher 
complexity of method and implementation time. The 
complexity of method can get better with several practices. 
Furthermore, the software tools for aiding the 
implementation process have just been developed, thus the 
tools will be further improved in the future. However, the 
analysis time consumption is also an important criterion for 
industries as they mostly have limited time resources because 
of increasing competition in the market. Some viable 
solutions to improve these drawbacks of SysML and STPA 
are presented below: 
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Possibility of creating a database in a STPA and SysML 
software tools. 
A feature of creating a database is widely used by modern 
software’s in different fields. For example, in 3D modeling, 
a database is created which stores all the models created and 
uploaded in the software, which then allows other users to 
download it afterwards instead of creating the same model 
again. Hence, in SysML a database containing all modeling 
elements such as blocks, requirements and constraints can be 
created which can be utilized to model another similar vessel 
or system. Similarly, in STPA, some of the hazards can be 
very similar between vessels or systems. Hence, a database 
that stores the elements such as control structure can be 
created.  
 
A database has a potential to reduce the modeling and risk 
analysis time consumption. Furthermore, downloading 
complex elements instead of creating them can reduce the 
complexity of method.   
 
Schematic layout of the system under assessment in a 
modeling tool. 
One of the limitations identified during this research was 
the unavailability of the layout of the system being analyzed 
inside the tool itself. The analyst must check the layout of the 
system constantly for generating SysML diagrams and 
control structure in STPA. It will be easier if the tool contains 
a separate window that can be toggled on/off to display the 
schematic layout of the system. The analyst can then toggle 
on the window whenever he requires during the modeling 
process. 
 
IV. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
The complexity in ship systems is further increasing. 
Traditional methods were not designed to handle complex 
ship systems since they were designed for the relatively 
simpler systems of the past. Although they have been 
modified to adapt current systems, they still lack in some 
extent to present some important information’s about the 
system. 
 
Based on the review,  Table 7 and Table 8 present the 
main research conclusions of modeling approaches and risk 
analysis methods respectively. The scale used in the 
conclusion tables is provided in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. The scale used in conclusion tables. 
None 
Low 
Average 
High 
Very high 
 
 Table 7. The research conclusions of the modelling approaches review. 
Question 
Tree structure 
method 
SysML 
What is the method’s complexity? Low High 
How much time is required for the 
method implementation? 
Low Very high 
What is the level of functionality? Low High 
How suitable is the method for 
modeling a complex ship system 
considering the results? 
Low High 
 
The research concludes that SysML is more complex and 
time consuming than the Tree structure method. However, 
unlike the Tree structure method, SysML models several 
aspects in a system such as behavior, requirements and 
support for engineering analysis. Hence, the functionality of 
SysML is significantly higher than the Tree structure method. 
Thus, considering the strengths and drawbacks, SysML is 
more suitable than the Tree structure method for modeling a 
complex ship system. 
 
Table 8. The research conclusions of the risk analysis methods review. 
Question FTA STPA 
What is the complexity of the 
method? 
Average High 
How much time is required for the 
method implementation? 
Average Very high 
What is the level of functionality? Average High 
What is the level of support for a 
systemic and systematic analysis? 
Average High 
How suitable is the method for 
analyzing risks in a complex ship 
system considering the results? 
Average High 
 
Similarly, STPA is more complex and time consuming 
than FTA because STPA follows a systemic approach that is 
different than most of the traditional risk analysis methods, 
and the analysis is more detailed in comparison. However, the 
functionality of STPA is better than FTA, which is very 
important for safety-critical systems. Although both are good 
at identifying risks due to the component failures, STPA is 
better at identifying risks due to the component interactions 
and human errors. In STPA, all possible interactions between 
components and controllers are analyzed, whereas in FTA the 
analysis depends on the preference and knowledge of the 
analysts. Thus, it is possible that the analysts conducting FTA 
will neglect some major risks and many minor risks due to 
the component interactions. Furthermore, both methods are 
systematic if the implementation process is followed 
correctly; but a systemic FTA of a complex ship system, with 
several sub-systems and the components, will result in large 
diagrams, which will be difficult to manage. Considering the 
strengths and drawbacks of each method, the research 
concludes that STPA is better than FTA. 
However, it must be also considered that for some 
companies, the available resources for an analysis such as 
human resources, time resources and financial resources for 
the modeling and risk analysis of a system can be limited. In 
that case, traditional methods, the tree structure method and 
FTA will be more effective than SysML and STPA unless the 
implementation process of SysML and STPA are improved. 
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V. FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
This chapter suggests some future research possibilities to 
improve the research further. 
 
Research on method’s adaptation to the design changes. 
A ship system’s design has been evolving in the past, and 
with ongoing autonomous ships projects, systems will keep 
evolving in the future. As the modeling and risks analysis of 
complex ship systems are lengthy processes, implementing 
the methods again from scratch after every design change can 
be tedious and costly. It would be beneficial for the 
companies and analysts if the earlier models could be 
modified according to the design changes. In that case, a 
version control system that keeps track and can manage 
earlier versions is also required. Hence, a study about the 
possibility of method is adapting to the design changes should 
be researched in future. 
 
Review of methods with the consideration of probability. 
As mentioned in the limitations to this paper, probabilistic 
methods were not considered for the review in this research 
due to the lack of data about the failure of ship systems. 
However, the feature of assessing the probability of 
occurrence for risks in ship systems is very important as it 
helps to have more focus on critical risks. As a result, it will 
increase the effectiveness of the risk analysis method and 
modeling approach as more resources can be allocated for 
critical risks or elements in the system. Hence, a review 
including the probabilistic methods can be viable if data 
about ship systems can be accessed. 
 
Review and comparison of the methods with a case study. 
The review of methods in this paper are based on the 
literatures review. A better comparison results can be 
achieved if these methods are implemented in a case study 
and feedback from experts are collected. Thus, a case study 
where these methods are applied to a complex ship system 
should be conducted and analyzed in future.  
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